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Abstract
We present a continuous-time contract whereby a top-level player can incentivize a hierar-
chy of players below him to act in his best interest despite only observing the output of his
direct subordinate. This paper extends Sannikov’s approach from a situation of asymmetric
information between a principal and an agent to one of hierarchical information between several
players. We develop an iterative algorithm for constructing an incentive compatible contract
and define the correct notion of concavity which must be preserved during iteration. We identify
conditions under which a dynamic programming construction of an optimal dynamic contract
can be reduced to only a one-dimensional state space and one-dimensional control set, inde-
pendent of the size of the hierarchy. In this sense, our results contribute to the applicability of
dynamic programming on dynamic contracts for a large-scale principal-agent hierarchy.
1 Introduction
A principal-agent problem is a problem of optimal contracting between two parties in an uncertain
environment. One player, namely the agent, may be able to influence the value of the output
process with his actions. A separate party, the principal, wants to maximize the output process,
which is subject to external noise.
It would be ideal for the principal to monitor the agent and enforce a strategy which is optimal
to the principal. This case if often called the first best. However, it is often costly for the principal
to monitor the agent’s action. In many practical situations, the principal can only observe the
output process, while the agent has perfect observations. Therefore, the agent is free to deviate
from the action or control suggested by the principal, and the principal may not be able to detect
this deviation. For example, the agent can shirk and attribute the resulting low output to noise.
In this setting of asymmetric information, the principal can only enforce an ‘incentive compatible’
control strategy upon the agent – a strategy which maximizes the agent’s expected utility given
the compensation scheme in the contract. Then, the principal’s optimal strategy is to design
the combination of a compensation scheme and a recommended control strategy such that (i)
the recommended control is optimal to the agent given the compensation scheme, and (ii) this
combination maximizes the principal’s expected utility. Such a combination constitutes a contract,
which is provided to the agent.
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This so-called second best strategy in principal-agent problems has been one of primary inter-
ests in economic studies on contracts [12]. In particular, principal-agent problems in continuous-
time have attracted considerable attention in economics, finance and engineering (e.g.,[10, 17, 26]).
Mathematically, such a principal-agent problem can be considered as a special case of Stackelberg
differential games [23]. While many Stackelberg differential game problems remain as a challenge
in general [2], there have been remarkable advances in solution approaches for principal-agent prob-
lems.
In Sannikov [20, 21], a dynamic programming approach is developed. The key idea is to introduce
another state variable, called the agent’s continuation value, which represents the agent’s expected
future utility conditioned upon the information up to current time. This approach is generalized
in [8] to handle more complicated dynamics of the output process and multiple agents. Another
stream of research utilizes the stochastic maximum principle [25, 4, 5]. This method requires us
to solve an associated forward-backward stochastic differential equation, which is a non-trivial task
(e.g., [1, 18, 13]).
In this paper, we consider a hierarchical principal-agent problem with asymmetric information
in the form of moral hazard. This means there exists a hierarchy of players, each of which acts as
a ‘principal’ to the ‘agent’ below them in the hierarchy.
P0 → P1 → · · · → Pk → Pk+1 → · · · → PN .
More precisely, in this hierarchy of players, Player k acts as a principal with Player k + 1 as his
agent. Moral hazard refers to the restriction that Player k can only compensate Player k + 1 based
upon an observable noisy output, but not upon the actions actually performed by Player k + 1. Due
to usefulness of contractual hierarchies in modeling a organizational form of firms, governments and
vertically-integrated economies, several contracts in a principal-agent hierarchy have been proposed
(e.g., [19, 15, 14]). However, these studies focus on incentive contracts in static settings. A recent
work [22] extends Holmstrom and Milgrom’s optimal linear contract [10] to the case of discrete-time
hierarchical contracting by using first-order conditions. To the authors’ best knowledge, our work
first develops a dynamic programming solution approach for designing optimal continuous-time
dynamic contracts in a principal-agent hierarchy.
The main result in continuous-time moral hazard problems between two players is that the
principal can provide a payment scheme which incentivizes the agent to act in the principal’s best
interest. In [20, 6], the success of these payment schemes depends upon certain concavity conditions
on the agent’s utility. The particular conditions and how to proceed when they are not met were
emphasized in [8].
The main idea of this paper is to construct a payment scheme for the hierarchical principal-agent
model, whereby Player 0 can incentivize all players below him to act in his best interest. At a high
level, the idea is to think of all players below Player 0 as an ‘aggregate agent’ and inductively apply
a generalized two player principal-agent result.
Principal → Aggregate Agent
P0 → P1 → · · · → Pk → Pk+1 → · · · → PN
The first contribution of this work is to illustrate how Player 0 can construct an optimal dynamic
contract which incentivizes the entire hierarchy to act in his best interest. Compared to [20], this
result allows Player 0 to indirectly incentivize even those players whose output he cannot directly
observe. Specifically, Player k can only monitor the output of Player k + 1 for k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1.
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The main technical issue in this result is that, in general, the effective utilities of each player in
the hierarchy will not be concave. To restore concavity, we develop a new concept called (f,Γ)-
concave envelopes, which play an essential role to design an optimal dynamic contract via dynamic
programming.
Secondly, this work illustrates how our hierarchical principal-agent model can resolve dimension-
ality issues in dynamic contract problems with multiple agents. Compared the contract constructed
by a single principal controlling multiple agents directly in [8], Player 0 only monitors one contin-
uation value in a dynamic programming solution of his optimization problem. Furthermore, the
maximization step is performed over a subset of efforts with dimension potentially less than N .
We show how to construct this subset by a novel iterative algorithm. This iterative construction
allows us to characterize a stochastic optimal control problem, which is equivalent to the original
contract design problem. An important feature of this stochastic optimal control problem is that
it is one-dimensional and therefore an optimal dynamic contract can be designed by solving an
one-dimensional dynamic programming problem.
The final contribution of this work is to characterize conditions under which the subset of efforts
which Player 0 can choose is a one-dimensional sub-manifold. In particular, we show that if each
effort has a utility function which is strictly concave, then we can parameterize the admissible
efforts by a function which we construct. In this case, we show Player 0 can construct an optimal
dynamic contract by solving an associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation with only one-
dimensional state space and one-dimensional admissible controls. We explicitly demonstrate this
HJB characterization in the case of agents with quadratic utilities.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide the mathematical setting
of the hierarchical principal-agent problem considered in this paper. In Section 3, we define a
generalized two player principal-agent problem and provide an optimal dynamic contract for the
principal. This contract is iteratively constructed in Section 4 to provide an optimal dynamic
contract for the hierarchical principal-agent problem. In Section 5 we consider more details about
the main concavity property of each agent’s utility which much be preserved during iteration,
called (f,Γ)-concavity. In particular, we prove a major result related to dimensionality reduction.
Finally, in Section 6, we consider a specific example and illustrate the steps involved in constructing
an optimal dynamic contract for the hierarchical model.
2 Problem Formulation
Consider a hierarchy of N + 1 players, each with a principal-agent relationship. We summarize the
information asymmetry in the following diagram:
P0 → P1 → · · · → Pk → Pk+1 → · · · → PN .
Note that Player k can only monitor the output of Player k + 1 for k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1. Because
the output is affected by external noise, Player k is not able to correctly infer Player k+ 1’s action.
For example, if output is low, Player k cannot deduce if it is because Player k + 1 performed little
effort or due to bad luck. Each player provides payment to the player below him in the hierarchy,
but the payment can only depend upon observable outputs and not the actual effort performed.
The goal of this paper is to define a payment mechanism whereby Player 0 can incentivize all
players below him to act in a prescribed manner, even though Player 0 cannot directly observe
their actions. The proposed payment mechanism is in the form of a contract between the principal,
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Player 0, and the aggregate agent, Players 1, · · · , N . The contract consists of a compensation
scheme and a recommended control strategy for each agent, i.e., Player k for k = 1, · · · , N . These
two components must be designed before the contract starts. Player 0’s interest is to design a
contract such that (i) given the compensation scheme each agent follows the recommended control
strategy, and (ii) this combination maximizes Player 0’s expected utility.
2.1 Mathematical Setup
We consider a continuous-time system representing the output of each player up to a terminal time,
T > 0. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space supporting a standard Brownian motion B with natural
filtration FB(t). We also consider output processes Xk with dynamics given below. We denote by
FXk(t) the filtration generated by the process Xk.
The dynamics of the system are as follows:
• Player N chooses an effort process AN which is adapted to FB . The output of Player N is a
process defined by
dXN = ANdt+ σdB.
• For k = 1, · · · , N − 1, Player k chooses an effort process Ak adapted to FXk+1 and terminal
compensation Rk+1 which is FXk+1(T )-measurable. The output of Player k is a process driven
by
dXk = Akdt+ dXk+1
= (Ak + · · ·+AN ) dt+ σdB.
(1)
Intuitively, Xk represents the cumulative output from effort by Player k and those below in
the hierarchy.
• Player 0 chooses a terminal compensation scheme R1 which is FX1(T )-measurable.
The utilities of the players are as follows:
• Player N has some cost for effort, and receives a terminal compensation from PN−1:
JN [AN , RN ] := EA
[∫ T
0
rN (AN ) dt+RN
]
.
• For k = 1, · · · , N − 1, Player k has some cost for effort, receives a terminal compensation
from Player k − 1, and pays a terminal compensation to Player k + 1:
Jk [Ak:N , Rk, Rk+1] := EA
[∫ T
0
rk (Ak) dt+Rk + q
k (Rk+1)
]
.
Note that the Player k’s utility can depend on Ak+1:N as well as Ak because Ak is adapted
to FXk+1 and Xk+1 is driven by (1) which depends on Ak+1:N . In other words, the utility
for Player k depends upon effort processes for Player k + 1 through Player N because these
processes affect the distribution of Xk+1, which affects the distribution of Ak directly.
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• Player 0 has utility from the output XN and pays a terminal compensation to Player 1:
J0 [A1:N , R1] := EA
[∫ T
0
dX1 + q
0 (R1)
]
= EA
[∫ T
0
A1 + · · ·+ANdt+ q0 (R1)
]
.
The notation Ak:N represents the tuple (Ak, · · · ,AN ). When k = 1, we will often use the notation
A to denote the tuple (A1, · · · ,AN ). The notation EA clarifies that we are taking expectation
under a measure where the dynamics of Xk are evolved via the choice of effort A. The set of
admissible control for Player k is given by
Ak := {Ak : [0, T ]→ R |Ak(t) is FXk+1(t)-progressively measurable}
for k = 1, · · · , N −1 and AN := {AN : [0, T ]→ R |AN (t) is FB(t)-progressively measurable}. The
set of admissible compensation for Player k is given by
Rk := {Rk ∈ R |Rk is FXk(T )-measurable}
for k = 2, · · · , N and R1 := {R1 ∈ R | R1 is FX1(T )-progressively measurable}. We also let
A := A1 × · · · × AN . Analogous notation is used for R.
In this paper we assume that, for each 1 ≤ k ≤ N , the function rk is concave and qk is decreasing
and linear. Economically, these assumptions correspond respectively to aversion to uncertainty in
effort and risk-neutrality over terminal payments.
2.2 Economic Problem
The goal of Player 0 is to prescribe compensation schemes, (R1, · · · , RN ), which allow him to
choose the effort for every player, (A1, · · · , AN ). In particular, he does this so as to maximize his
expected utility. However, because Player 0 cannot directly observe efforts, the choice must satisfy
an incentive compatibility condition – that Player k would not be better off (i) by providing Player
k+1 a different compensation scheme R′k+1 or (ii) by performing a different effort A
′
k. Furthermore,
Player 0 cannot force other players to accept a contract, so the choice must satisfy an individual
rationality condition – that Player k is paid more than a minimum required to accept the contract.
We let wk ∈ R be the minimum required utility for Player k.
Optimal Dynamic Contracts for a Principal-Agent Hierarchy 6
Player 0’s optimization problem can then be formulated as follows:
sup
A∈A,R∈R
J0[A1:N , R1]
subject to J1[A1:N , R1, R2] ≥ J1[A′1:N , R1, R′2] ∀(A′1:N , R′2) ∈ A1:N ×R2
J1[A1:N , R1, R2] ≥ w1
...
Jk[Ak:N , Rk, Rk+1] ≥ Jk[A′k:N , Rk, R′k+1] ∀(A′k:N , R′k+1) ∈ Ak:N ×Rk+1
Jk[Ak:N , Rk, Rk+1] ≥ wk
...
JN [AN , RN ] ≥ JN [A′N , RN ] ∀A′N ∈ AN
JN [AN , RN ] ≥ wN ,
(2)
where the restrictions represents incentive compatibility and individual rationality conditions for
the other players.
In summary, Player 0 proposes a set of recommended effort processes A ∈ A and terminal
compensations R ∈ R in order to maximize his expected utility. The first two constraints refer to
Player 1’s incentive compatibility and individual rationality respectively – for fixed R1, the proposed
choices must maximize Player 1’s expected utility and meet a minimum utility for him to accept
the contract. Each pair of constraints after that represent the analogous incentive compatibility
and individual rationality constraints for each Player k.
As written, Player 0’s optimization problem is non-trivial to solve primarily because it is unclear
how to deal with the various incentive compatibility constraints. We will show that these constraints
can be replaced by restrictions on the form of the terminal payments R and admissible suggested
efforts. Furthermore, the reformulation will be proven to be exact.
2.3 Main Result
The main result of this paper is to extend the continuous-time formalism described for two player
Stackelberg differential games by Sannikov [20] to this hierarchical setup. We will show that for
a particular choice of payment schemes, (R1, · · · , RN ), the incentive compatibility conditions will
automatically be satisfied.
We will show that Player 0’s optimization problem (2) is equivalent to the following optimization
problem:
sup
A∈A,Y1∈Y
J0[A,R1]
s.t. A(t) ∈ Γ ⊆ RN , t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.
Y1(t) ∈ (∂φˆ) (A1(t) + · · ·+AN (t)) , t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.
for a particular choice of (R1, · · · , RN ) ∈ R, a given concave function φˆ : R → R, and a given
subset Γ ⊆ RN , which will be characterized. Here, ∂φˆ represents the super-gradient of φˆ, and
Y := {Y : [0, T ]→ R |Y(t) is FB(t)-progressively measurable}.
The intuition is that Player 0 has an optimal effort process A in mind. Player 0 provides Player
1 with a terminal compensation R1, which incentivizes him to cause the rest of the hierarchy to
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follow A = (A1, · · · , AN ). The function φˆ represents the effective cost that Player 1 has to cause
the hierarchy to follow A, and Y1 represents the marginal cost.
There is not an explicit form for Γ and φˆ, but the iterative algorithm defined in Theorem 2 is
constructive. In Section 5, we show that if all players have utilities which are strictly concave, then
Γ is a one-dimensional manifold.
The main idea of the construction of the contract is to iteratively apply a generalization of a
two player principal-agent result. The main technical condition that this generalization features
over those in [6, 20] is f -concavity, which was highlighted in [8]. When dealing with generalized
dynamics for the output process, as in the hierarchical case, f -concavity is the key condition an
agent’s utility must satisfy for a principal to incentivize him to follow a given effort. We will show
how this concavity condition can be preserved as we iteratively apply the two player principal-agent
result. This process leads to constraints on (A1, · · · , AN ), which are encoded in the subset Γ.
This simplified problem is a standard stochastic control problem which may be solved by dynamic
programming or, equivalently, by solving an associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Then,
Player 0 can explicitly construct a dynamic contract which is incentive compatible for all players,
satisfies all individual rationality constraints, and maximizes his expected utility.
In particular, define the value function of Player 0 as
v(w, t) := sup
A∈A∗,Y1∈Y∗
EA
[∫ T
t
N∑
k=1
Ak(s)ds+ q
0 (R1) |W (t) = w
]
,
where A∗ := A ∩ {A : [0, T ] → R |A(t) ∈ Γ, t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.}, Y∗ := Y ∩ {Y : [0, T ] → R |Y(t) ∈
(∂φˆ)
(
1>A(t)
)
, t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.}, and W (t) solves the following stochastic differential equation:
dW (t) = −µ1(A(t))dt− σY (t)dB.
The drift function µ1 : RN → R is defined in the iteration algorithm as a linear combination of each
player’s utility function. The constant σ is the volatility of X1. The interpretation of W (t) is the
continuation value for Player 1 – his remaining expected utility from following the proposed effort
conditioned on the information up to time t.
Then, v is the unique viscosity solution of the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equa-
tion:
vt + sup
a∈Γ1
y∈(∂φˆ1)(1>a)
[
1
2
y2σ2vww − µ1(a)vw + 1>a
]
= 0,
with terminal condition v(w, T ) = q(w), where Γ1 ⊆ Γ will be characterized in the following
sections. After solving the HJB, Player 0 can then construct an optimal contract by constructing
an optimal feedback control A∗(t) ∈ Γ1 and Y ∗(t) ∈ (∂φˆ)(1>A∗(t)) starting from the initial value
W (0) which will be specified. Furthermore, the optimal feedback control will be adapted to the
correct filtrations. Therefore, the proposed contract is implementable.
3 Contract for Generalized Principal-Agent Problem
In this section, we consider a generalized principal-agent problem between two players. We propose
a contract and demonstrate its incentive compatibility and optimality. We will ultimately iterate
this result in the full principal-agent hierarchy in Section 4.
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Compared to [20, 8], this problem features generalized dynamics, lack of concavity on the agent’s
utility, and constraints on what efforts the agent may choose. All three of these features will arise
naturally in our iterative construction of a contract for the principal-agent hierarchy.
3.1 The Setting
As in the hierarchical model, we consider a continuous-time system with an underlying probability
space (Ω,F ,P) supporting a standard Brownian motion B with filtration FB . There are also two
output processes Xα and Xpi with dynamics defined below. We also take special consideration of the
filtrations FXα and FXpi which represent those generated by the processes Xα and Xpi respectively.
In this problem, the single agent chooses an n-dimensional effort process A = (A1, · · · , An),
which is restricted to be FB-adapted and lie in a prescribed subset Γ ⊆ Rn almost surely. Mean-
while, the principal chooses a one-dimensional effort process P , which must be FXα -adapted, as
well as a terminal payment to the agent, Rα, which must be FXα(T )-measurable. The principal
also receives a terminal payment, Rpi, which is FXpi (T )-measurable – the interpretation is that this
is a utility from a player higher in the hierarchy.
The dynamics of Xα and Xpi are given by
dXα = f(A)dt+ σdB,
dXpi = Pdt+ dXα.
The utilities for each party are given by
Jα[A,Rα] := EA
[
w0 +
∫ T
0
rα(A)dt+Rα
]
,
Jpi[P,A,Rα, Rpi] := EA
[∫ T
0
rpi(P,Xα)dt+ q
pi(Rα) +Rpi
]
.
The principal’s optimization problem can then be written as follows:
sup
P∈P¯,A∈A¯,Rα∈R¯
Jpi[P,A,Rα, Rpi]
subject to Jα[A,Rα] ≥ Jα[A′, Rα] ∀A′ ∈ A¯
A(t) ∈ Γ, t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.
Jα[A,Rα] ≥ wα,
(3)
where A¯ := {A : [0, T ] → R | A(t) is FB(t)-progressively measurable}, P¯ := {P : [0, T ] →
R |P(t) is FXα(t)-progressively measurable} and R¯ := {R ∈ R |R is FXα(T )-measurable}.
Intuitively, this problem represents a principal-agent problem with generalized dynamics and
utilities. The agent chooses a multi-dimensional effort process to determine his output process.
On the other hand, the principal chooses a one-dimensional effort process and a terminal payment
based upon the agent’s output process and some external noise.
The requirement that each process be adapted to different filtrations represents the information
asymmetry in the problem in the form of moral hazard. The relationship with our hierarchical
problem will be that the principal represents Player k, while the agent represents Player k + 1
controlling the efforts of all those players below him in the hierarchy.
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3.2 f-Concavity and (f,Γ)-Concave Envelopes
In this subsection, we define the key concavity condition required for the proposed contract to be
incentive compatible and optimal.
Definition 1. Let f : Rm → Rn. We say a function g : Rm → R is f -concave if there exists a
concave function φ : Rn → R such that
g(x) = φ(f(x)) ∀x ∈ Rm.
This condition was shown in [8] to be key to incentive compatibility in standard principal-
agent problems. In particular, it was shown that if the agent’s utility was not f -concave, then the
principal is restricted to particular values of effort depending on the so-called f -concave envelope
of the agent’s utility.
In this paper, as we iterate along the hierarchy, there will always be restrictions on the set of
admissible efforts. Therefore, we need a generalized notion of concave envelopes.
Definition 2. Let g : Rm → R be some function and Γ ⊆ Rm. We say gˆ : Rm → R is the
(f,Γ)-concave envelope of g if
• gˆ is f -concave,
• gˆ(x) ≥ g(x) for all x ∈ Γ, and
• If g˜ is an f -concave function such that g˜(x) ≥ g(x) for all x ∈ Γ, then g˜(x) ≥ gˆ(x) for all
x ∈ Γ.
When convenient, we may refer to gˆ by φˆ ◦ f .
We show in Section 5 how to construct the (f,Γ)-concave envelope of an arbitrary function.
The equivalence gˆ = φˆ ◦ f refers to an auxillary concave function φˆ produced by the construction.
We also explicitly define the touching set to be the subset where g = gˆ.
Definition 3. Let gˆ be the (f,Γ)-concave envelope of g. We define the corresponding touching set
to be:
Γ′ := {x ∈ Γ : g(x) = gˆ(x)} .
An example of the touching set is shown in Figure 1. Finally, we recall the definition of the
super-gradient [3, 7] of a concave function.
Definition 4. Let φ : Rn → R be a concave function. For any x ∈ Rn, define the super-gradient
of φ at x as the following set:
∂φ(x) :=
{
y ∈ Rn : φ(x) + y> (x′ − x) ≥ φ(x′) ∀x′ ∈ Rn} .
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x
g
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 0
Figure 1: gˆ is the (f,Γ)-concave envelope of g when f(x) = x and Γ = R. Γ′ is the corresponding
touching set.
3.3 The Contract
We claim that for any desired choice of (A1, · · · , An), there exists a compensation Rα which incen-
tivizes the agent to follow the desired effort. Furthermore, it is optimal for the principal to choose
a contract of this particular form.
Let rˆα = φˆ ◦ f be the (f,Γ)-concave envelope of rα, and let
Γ′ := {(a1, · · · , an) ∈ Γ | rˆα(a1, · · · , an) = rα(a1, · · · , an)}
be the corresponding touching set. We also introduce an auxiliary control variable Y which
plays an important role in designing a compensation Rα that satisfies the incentive compati-
bility and individual rationality. The set of admissible Y ’s is given by Y¯ := {Y : [0, T ] →
R |Y(t) is FB(t)-progressively measurable}.
Proposition 1. Fix P ∈ P¯. For any choice of processes A ∈ A¯ such that A(t) ∈ Γ′ for t ∈ [0, T ]
a.e., and Y ∈ Y¯ such that Y (t) ∈ (∂φˆ) (f(A(t))) for t ∈ [0, T ] a.e., define
Rα := wα −w0 +
∫ T
0
f(A)Y − rα(A)dt−
∫ T
0
Y dXα. (4)
Then, A is incentive compatible with Rα, i.e.
Jα[A,Rα] ≥ Jα[A′, Rα] ∀A′ ∈ A¯ ∩ {A : [0, T ]→ R |A(t) ∈ Γ, t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.},
and also satisfies the agent’s individual rationality constraint, i.e.
Jα[A,Rα] ≥ wα.
Proof. Suppose that the agent instead follows an arbitrary choice of effort A′ = (A′1, · · · , A′n) ∈
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A¯ ∩ {A : [0, T ]→ R |A(t) ∈ Γ, t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.}. Then, we compute
Jα[A′, Rα] := EA
′
[
w0 +
∫ T
0
rα(A′)dt+Rα
]
= wα + EA
′
[∫ T
0
rα(A′)− rˆα(A) + f(A)Y dt−
∫ T
0
Y dXα
]
≤ wα + EA′
[∫ T
0
rˆα(A′)− rˆα(A) + Y [f(A)− f(A′)] dt
]
≤ wα.
The key in this argument is that if the agent follows A′ instead of A, then the process Xα evolves
as
dXα = f(A
′)dt+ σdBA
′
,
where BA
′
is a PA′-Brownian motion. The existence of the new probability measure PA′ is guaran-
teed by the Girsanov theorem (e.g., [11]). The rest follows from concavity using A(t) ∈ Γ′, rˆα ≥ rα,
rˆα = φˆ ◦ f , and the definition of ∂φˆ.
If the agent follows the suggested effort A = (A1, · · · , An) ∈ A¯ ∩ {A : [0, T ]→ R |A(t) ∈ Γ′, t ∈
[0, T ] a.e.}, we have
Jα[A,Rα] := EA
[
w0 +
∫ T
0
rα(A)dt+Rα
]
= wα + EA
[∫ T
0
rα(A)− rˆα(A) + f(A)Y dt−
∫ T
0
Y dXα
]
= wα + EA
[∫ T
0
rα(A)− rˆα(A)dt
]
= wα ≥ Jα[A′, Rα] ∀A′ ∈ A¯ ∩ {A : [0, T ]→ R |A(t) ∈ Γ, t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.}.
Here, the last equality holds due to the fact that A(t) is in the touching set Γ′ for t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.
Therefore, A is incentive compatible withRα and the individual rationality condition is satisfied.
Note that Rα given by (4) is not an admissible compensation scheme because it may not be
FXα(T )-measurable. In fact, it is FB(T )-measurable. However, we will show in the following
subsection that any contract optimal to the principal has Rα such that it is FXα(T )-measurable
and therefore is implementable.
3.4 Optimality for Principal
In the previous subsection, we proved that a class of contracts is incentive compatible and individ-
ually rational for the agent. In this subsection, we prove that it is sufficient for the principal to
consider only contracts of this form. In other words, the proposed class of contracts is optimal to
the principal.
First, we prove two inequalities which relate rα to its (f,Γ)-concave envelope rˆα = φˆ ◦ f and
the super-gradient ∂φˆ.
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Lemma 1. Let rˆα = φˆ ◦ f be the (f,Γ)-concave envelope of rα and recall
Γ′ := {a ∈ Γ | rα(a) = rˆα(a)} .
Then, for any a ∈ Γ, we have
1. If y 6∈ (∂φˆ) (f(a)), then there exists a′ ∈ Γ such that
rˆα(a) + y(f(a′)− f(a)) < rα(a′).
2. If y ∈ (∂φˆ) (f(a)) and a 6∈ Γ′, then there exists a′ ∈ Γ such that:
rα(a) + y(f(a′)− f(a)) < rα(a′).
Proof. Both proofs proceed by contradiction by building a better (f,Γ)-concave envelope than
rˆα = φˆ ◦ f .
1. First, let y 6∈ (∂φˆ) (f(a)). Then, there exists a′ ∈ Γ such that
rˆα(a) + y(f(a′)− f(a)) < rˆα(a′).
Furthermore, suppose that in fact for all a′ ∈ Γ we have
rˆα(a) + y(f(a′)− f(a)) ≥ rα(a′).
Define a function r˜α : Rn → R as
r˜α(x) := min {rˆα(x), rˆα(a) + y(f(x)− f(a))} .
Then, we have
r˜α ≥ rα.
Therefore, r˜α is f -concave as the minimum of two f -concave functions. However, at a′, we
have
r˜α(a′) = rˆα(a) + y(f(a′)− f(a)) < rˆα(a′).
However, this contradicts the fact that rˆα is the (f,Γ)-concave envelope. Therefore, there
exists a′ ∈ Γ such that
rˆα(a) + y(f(a′)− f(a)) < rα(a′).
2. Next, let y ∈ (∂φˆ) (f(a)), but a 6∈ Γ′. Then, rα(a) < rˆα(a). Furthermore, suppose that in
fact for all a′ ∈ Γ we have
rα(a) + y(f(a′)− f(a)) ≥ rα(a′).
Define a function r˜α : Rn → R as
r˜α(x) := min {rˆα(x), rα(a) + y(f(x)− f(a))}
Then, we have
r˜α ≥ rα.
Therefore, r˜α is f -concave as the minimum of two f -concave functions. However, at a, we
compute
r˜α(a) = rα(a) < rˆα(a).
This is contradictory to the fact that rˆα is the (f,Γ)-concave envelope. Therefore, there
should exist a′ ∈ Γ such that rα(a) + y(f(a′)− f(a)) < rα(a′).
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Next, we demonstrate that any incentive compatible contract must be in the form of that defined
above. This will suggest that it is in fact optimal for the principal to choose a contract of this form.
Proposition 2. Suppose that A ∈ A¯ ∩ {A : [0, T ] → R | A(t) ∈ Γ, t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.} is incentive
compatible with Rα ∈ R¯. Then, the following must hold:
Rα = w +
∫ T
0
f(A)Y − rα(A)dt−
∫ T
0
Y dXα (3)
for some constant w ∈ R, where Y ∈ Y¯ such that Y (t) ∈ (∂φˆ) (f(A(t))) for t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.
Proof. Let A ∈ A¯ ∩ {A : [0, T ] → R |A(t) ∈ Γ, t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.} and Rα ∈ R¯ satisfy the incentive
compatibility constraint. Define
V (t) := EA
[∫ T
t
rα(A)ds+Rα | FB(t)
]
.
By the Martingale representation theorem (e.g., [11, 16]), there exists a unique (up to a set of zero
measure) process Y ∈ Y¯ such that
V (t) +
∫ t
0
rα(A)ds = w −
∫ t
0
σαY dB
= w +
∫ t
0
f(A)Y ds−
∫ t
0
Y dXα,
where w = V (0). Then, we have
Rα = V (T )
= w +
∫ T
0
f(A)Y − rα(A)dt−
∫ T
0
Y dXα.
Next, we show that Y (t) ∈ (∂φˆ) (f(A(t))) for t ∈ [0, T ] a.e. Suppose that Y (t) 6∈ (∂φˆ) (f(A(t)))
for t ∈ T1, where T1 is a set of a strictly positive P× λ-measure. By the first claim in Lemma 1, we
can find A′ ∈ A¯ ∩ {A : [0, T ]→ R |A(t) ∈ Γ, t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.} such that
rˆα(A(t)) + Y (t) [f(A′(t))− f(A(t))] < rα(A′(t)) ∀t ∈ T1.
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Then, the agent would prefer to follow A′ over A because
Jα[A′, Rα] = EA
′
[
w0 +
∫ T
0
rα(A′)dt+Rα
]
= w0 + w + EA
′
[∫ T
0
rα(A′)− rα(A) + Y [f(A)− f(A′)] dt
]
≥ w0 + w + EA′
[∫ T
0
rα(A′)− rˆα(A) + Y [f(A)− f(A′)] dt
]
> w0 + w + EA
′
[∫ T
0
rα(A′)− rα(A′)dt
]
= w0 + w
= Jα[A,Rα].
But this contradicts the incentive compatibility of the contract, so Y (t) ∈ (∂φˆ) (f(A(t))) for t ∈
[0, T ] a.e.
The compensation given solely by (3) is FB(T )-measurable and may not be in R¯. In Theorem
1, we will design an optimal contract in a relaxed space such that (3) holds, and show that at an
optimum the compensation is in R¯ and therefore is implementable.
Next, we show that the principal should only consider contracts with the suggested effort such
that A(t) ∈ Γ′ for t ∈ [0, T ] a.e. Any other suggested effort would not be incentive compatible.
Proposition 3. For any incentive compatible contract, we have
A ∈ A ∩ {A : [0, T ]→ R |A(t) ∈ Γ′, t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.},
where
Γ′ := {(a1, · · · , an) ∈ Γ | rˆα(a1, · · · , an) = rα(a1, · · · , an)} .
Proof. By Proposition 2, the compensation of any incentive compatible contract must be of the
form
Rα = w +
∫ T
0
f(A)Y − rα(A)dt−
∫ T
0
Y dXα
with Y ∈ Y¯ such that Y (t) ∈ (∂φˆ) (f(A(t))) for t ∈ [0, T ] a.e. given A ∈ A¯∩{A : [0, T ]→ R |A(t) ∈
Γ, t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.}. Suppose that A(t) 6∈ Γ′ for t ∈ T2, where T2 is a set of a strictly positive P× λ-
measure. By Lemma 1, we can find A′′ ∈ A¯ ∩ {A : [0, T ] → R | A(t) ∈ Γ, t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.} such
that
rα(A(t)) + Y (t) [f(A′′(t))− f(A(t))] < rα(A′′(t)) ∀t ∈ T2.
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But we can check, the agent would prefer to follow A′′ over A since
Jα[A′′, Rα] = EA
′′
[
w0 +
∫ T
0
rα(A′′)dt+Rα
]
= w0 + w + EA
′′
[∫ T
0
rα(A′′)− rα(A) + Y [f(A)− f(A′′)] dt
]
> w0 + w
= Jα[A,Rα].
But this contradicts the incentive compatibility of the contract, so (A1(t), · · · , An(t)) ∈ Γ′ for
t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.
Finally, because qpi is strictly decreasing, we can argue that it suffices to consider contracts with
w = wα − w0. This choice makes the individual rationality constraint binding. Any larger choice
of w would be sub-optimal for the principal.
Up to this point, we have made no reference to the payment Rpi that the principal receives at the
terminal time, which can be quite general. We have restricted the class of admissible compensation
schemes for the agent, but which of the remaining the principal chooses will depend upon Rpi. In
particular, the principal will solve an optimization problem summarized in the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Consider the following optimization problem:
sup
P∈P¯,A∈A¯,Y ∈Y¯
Jpi[P,A,Rα, Rpi]
subject to A(t) ∈ Γ′ ⊆ Rn, t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.
Y (t) ∈ (∂φˆ) (f(A(t))) , t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.,
(4)
where Rα is given by
Rα = wα −w0 +
∫ T
0
f (A)Y − rα(A)dt−
∫ T
0
Y dXα. (5)
Then, the optimization problem (4) is equivalent to the original contract design problem (3).
Proof. By Propositions 2 and 3, incentive compatible contracts Rα are characterized by
Rα = w +
∫ T
0
f(A)Y − rα(A)dt−
∫ T
0
Y dXα
for w ∈ R, A ∈ A¯ such that A(t) ∈ Γ′ ⊆ Rn and Y ∈ Y¯ such that Y (t) ∈ (∂φˆ) (f(A(t))) for t ∈ [0, T ]
a.e. By the same computation as in Proposition 3, we observe that Rα is individually rational for
the agent if and only if
Jα [A,Rα] = w0 + w ≥ wα.
Now suppose Rα has w > wα −w0. Then, we define a new utility,
R′α = wα −w0 +
∫ T
0
f(A)Y − rα(A)dt−
∫ T
0
Y dXα.
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Note that both (A,Rα) and (A,R
′
α) satisfy the incentive compatibility and individual rationality
conditions. However, we have
Jpi [P,A,R′α, Rpi] = J
pi [P,A,Rα, Rpi] + EA [qpi(R′α)− qpi(Rα)]
> Jpi [P,A,Rα, Rpi] ,
because qpi is strictly decreasing and R′α − Rα = wα − w0 − w < 0 almost surely. Therefore, we
conclude it is optimal for the principal to choose w = wα −w0.
Let A∗ and Y ∗ solve the optimization problem (4). We now show that Rα given by (5) with A∗
and Y ∗ is in R¯ and therefore is implementable. The problem (4) can be rewritten as the following
stochastic optimal control problem:
sup
P∈P¯,A∈A¯,Y ∈Y¯
Jpi[P,A,Rα, Rpi]
subject to dW = −rα(A)dt− Y dB
= (f(A)Y − rα(A))dt− Y dXα
W (0) = wα −w0
Rα = W (T )
A(t) ∈ Γ′ ⊆ Rn, t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.
Y (t) ∈ (∂φˆ) (f(A(t))) , t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.,
which can be solved by dynamic programming. Its solution is given by a feedback control, (A∗, Y ∗) =
(A∗(W (t)), Y ∗(W (t))). Since W is adapted to FXα , so are A∗ and Y ∗. Therefore, Rα given by (5)
with A∗ and Y ∗ is FXα(T )-measurable and therefore is in R¯.
In summary, we have converted a quite general two-player principal-agent with individual ratio-
nality and incentive compatibility constraints into an equivalent stochastic optimal problem with
only point-wise restrictions on the values of the effort process. The idea in the remainder of the
paper will be to iterate this choice with explicit choices of Rpi to solve Player 0’s problem in the
principal-agent hierarchy.
4 Contract for Principal-Agent Hierarchy
Our goal here is to inductively apply the result from above. The hope is that Player 0 can design
compensation R1, · · · , RN in such a way that Players 1 through Player N will find it optimal to
follow the desired efforts.
Principal → Aggregate Agent
P0 → P1 → · · · → Pk → Pk+1 → · · · → PN
Theorem 2. Suppose that qk(r) = −βkr for k = 1, · · · , N − 1. Let
µk(Ak:N ) :=
N∑
j=k
γk,jr
j(Aj), w
∗
k :=
N∑
j=k
γk,jwj (6)
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with γk,k := 1, γk,j :=
∏j−1
`=k β`, j = k + 1, · · · , N , for k = 1, · · · , N − 1. Let φˆN be the concave
envelope of rN = µN and ΓN := {aN ∈ R|rN (aN ) = φˆN (aN )}. Set φˆk as (Ak+· · ·+AN ,R×Γk+1)-
concave envelope of µk and Γk ⊆ RN−k+1 as the corresponding touching set for k = N − 1, · · · , 1.
Consider the following optimization problem:
sup
A∈A,Y1∈Y
J0[A,R1]
subject to A(t) ∈ Γ1 ⊆ RN , t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.
Y1(t) ∈ (∂φˆ1) (A1(t) + · · ·+AN (t)) , t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.,
(7)
where
R1 := w
∗
1 +
∫ T
0
(A1 + · · ·+AN )Y1 − µ1 (A) dt−
∫ T
0
Y1dX1.
Then, the optimization problem (7) is equivalent to the original contract design problem (2).
The intuition behind this result is that by choosing a compensation scheme of the form R1,
Player 0 can incentivize every player below him in the hierarchy to follow a ‘suggested effort’
process A = (A1, · · · , AN ). However, it is only possible for Player 0 to incentivize the hierarchy to
follow efforts A(t) ∈ Γ1.
The function µ1 : RN → R represents the cost to Player 0 for incentivizing the hierarchy to
perform A. The constant w∗1 represents a minimum expected utility Player 0 must provide to
satisfy the entire hierarchy’s individual rationality contraints. Intuitively, the function φˆ1 encodes
information about incentive compatibility conditions.
Proof. We proceed by induction. In the base case, we fix a choice of RN−1. Player N − 1 will then
solve the following optimization problem:
sup
AN−1:N∈AN−1:N
RN∈RN
JN−1[AN−1, AN , RN−1, RN ]
subject to JN [AN , RN ] ≥ JN [A′N , RN ] ∀A′N ∈ AN
JN [AN , RN ] ≥ wN .
This falls in the form of the generalized two player principal-agent problem. Therefore, we can
define the compensation RN as
RN := wN +
∫ T
0
ANYN − rN (AN )dt−
∫ T
0
YNdXN ,
where YN ∈ Y such that YN (t) ∈ ∂φˆN (AN (t)) for t ∈ [0, T ] a.e., and φˆN is the standard concave-
envelope of rN . Define the set
ΓN := {aN ∈ R | rN (aN ) = φˆN (aN )}.
Due to Theorem 1, it is equivalent for Player N − 1 to solve
sup
AN−1:N∈AN−1:N
YN∈Y
JN−1[AN−1, AN , RN−1, RN ]
subject to AN (t) ∈ ΓN , t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.
YN (t) ∈ ∂φˆN (AN (t)), t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.
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Next, we consider the inductive step. For fixed Rk, Player k solves the following optimization
problem:
sup
Ak:N∈Ak:N
Rk+1:N∈Rk+1:N
Jk[Ak:N , Rk, Rk+1]
subject to Jk+1[Ak+1:N , Rk+1, Rk+2] ≥ Jk+1[A′k+1:N , Rk+1, R′k+2]
∀A′k+1:N ∈ Ak+1:N , R′k+2 ∈ Rk+2
Jk+1[Ak+1:N , Rk+1, Rk+1] ≥ wk+1
...
JN [AN , RN ] ≥ JN [A′N , RN ] ∀A′N ∈ AN
JN [AN , RN ] ≥ wN .
The inductive assumption is that it is equivalent for Player k to solve
sup
Ak:N∈Ak:N
Yk+1∈Y
Jk[Ak:N , Rk, Rk+1]
subject to Ak+1:N (t) ∈ Γk+1, t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.
Yk+1(t) ∈ (∂φˆk+1)(Ak+1(t) + · · ·+AN (t)), t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.,
where
Rk+1 = w
∗
k+1 +
∫ T
0
(Ak+1 + · · ·AN )Yk+1 − µk+1(Ak+1:N )dt−
∫ T
0
Yk+1dXk+1, (8)
given Γk+1 ⊆ RN−k, φˆk+1 : R→ R concave, and
µk+1(Ak+1:N ) :=
N∑
`=k+1
γk+1,jr
j(Aj)
w∗k+1 :=
N∑
j=k+1
γk+1,jwj
with γk+1,k+1 := 1 and γk+1,j :=
∏j−1
`=k+1 β`, j = k + 2, · · · , N .
We next fix Rk−1 and focus on the analogous optimization problem for Player k − 1. Player
k − 1 chooses (Rk, · · · , RN ) and (Ak−1, · · · , AN ) subject to incentive compatibility and individual
rationality for Player k through Player N . By the inductive hypothesis, incentive compatibility and
individual rationality for Players k + 1, · · · , N is equivalent to considering Rk+1 of the form (8).
Therefore, we can write the optimization problem of Player k − 1 as
sup
Ak−1:N∈Ak−1:N
Rk∈Rk
Jk−1[Ak−1:N , Rk−1, Rk]
subject to Jk[Ak:N , Rk, Rk+1] ≥ Jk[A′k:N , Rk, Rk+1]
∀A′k:N ∈ Ak:N ∪ {Ak:N : [0, T ]→ RN−k+1 |Ak:N (t) ∈ R× Γk+1, t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.}
Jk[Ak:N , Rk, Rk+1] ≥ wk
Ak:N (t) ∈ R× Γk+1, t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.
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We note that it is now in the form of a generalized principal-agent problem. Furthermore, with this
choice of Rk+1, we can re-write the utility for Player k as
Jk[Ak:N , Rk, Rk+1] := EA
[∫ T
0
rk(Ak)dt+Rk + q
k(Rk+1)
]
= EA
[∫ T
0
rk(Ak)dt+Rk − βkRk+1
]
= EA
[
−βkw∗k+1 +
∫ T
0
rk(Ak) + βkµk+1(Ak+1:N )dt+Rk
]
.
Define
µk(Ak:N ) := r
k(Ak) + βkµk+1(Ak+1:N ).
By Theorem 1, it is equivalent for Player k − 1 to solve:
sup
Ak−1:N∈Ak−1:N
Yk∈Y
Jk−1[Ak−1:N , Rk−1, Rk]
subject to Ak:N (t) ∈ Γk ⊆ RN−k+1, t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.
Yk(t) ∈ (∂φˆk)(Ak(t) + · · ·+AN (t)), t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.,
where
Rk := wk + βkw
∗
k+1 +
∫ T
0
(Ak + · · ·+AN )Yk − µk(Ak:N )dt−
∫ T
0
YkdXk,
φˆk(Ak + · · ·+ AN ) is the (Ak + · · ·+ AN ,R× Γk+1)-concave envelope of µk, and Γk ⊆ RN−k+1 is
the corresponding touching subset.
By induction, we conclude that it is equivalent for Player 0 to solve the following optimization
problem:
sup
A∈A,Y1∈Y
J0[A,R1]
subject to A(t) ∈ Γ1 ⊆ RN , t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.
Y1(t) ∈ (∂φˆ1)(A1(t) + · · ·+AN (t)), t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.,
where
R1 = w
∗
1 +
∫ T
0
(A1 + · · ·+AN )Y1 − µ1(A)dt−
∫ T
0
Y1dX1,
where µ1 and w
∗
1 are given by (6), φˆ1 is (A1 + · · · + AN ,R × Γ2)-concave envelope of µ1, and
Γ1 ⊆ RN is the corresponding touching set.
Remark 1. Although we do not explicitly state the form of R2, · · · , RN in Theorem 2, the details
of the proof reveal that they will each be as follows:
Rk := w
∗
k +
∫ T
0
(Ak + · · ·+AN )Yk − µk (Ak:N ) dt−
∫ T
0
YkdXk
where
µk(Ak:N ) :=
N∑
j=k
γk,jr
j(Aj), w
∗
k :=
N∑
j=k
γk,jwj
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with γk,k := 1, k = 1, · · · , N and γi,j :=
∏j−1
`=i β`, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ N , and
Yk(t) ∈ (∂φˆk) (Ak(t) + · · ·+AN (t)) , (8)
with φˆk : R→ R defined in Theorem 2. The particular choice of Y2, · · · , YN will not affect the utility
for Player 0, whenever (8) holds, because it only depends upon R1. The function µk represents the
cost that Player k− 1 must pay for incentivizing the hierarchy from Player k to Player N to follow
the suggested effort Ak:N . The scalar constant w
∗
k represents a minimum expected utility that Player
k−1 must provide to satisfy the individuality rationality constraints for Players k, · · · , N . By using
the argument in Theorem (2), we can confirm that Rk is FXk(T )-measurable. Therefore, an optimal
contract obtained by the proposed method is implementable. Furthermore, it is verifiable because an
optimal Ak is adapted to FXk .
We refer to the components A1:N and R2:N as ‘suggested’ efforts and compensations because
Player 0 does not have to force the other players to choose them – we have shown it is optimal for
players lower in the hierarchy to construct these contracts on their own. For this reason, we do not
explicitly write them down in the theorem statement.
At this point, Player 0 can solve this equivalent optimization problem via the dynamic pro-
gramming principle and an associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Player 0’s optimization
problem has a running cost associated with the choice of A and Y , as well as a terminal compen-
sation associated with R1. Then, it is natural to introduce a state variable W with the property
that W (T ) = R1:
Definition 5. Given a choice of processes (A, Y ), we define the continuation value of the aggregate
agents as
W (t) := w∗1 +
∫ t
0
(A1 + · · ·+AN )Y − µ1(A)ds−
∫ t
0
Y dX1
= w∗1 −
∫ t
0
µ1(A)ds−
∫ t
0
σY dB.
Then, W (T ) = R1.
Remark 2. The term ‘continuation value’ refers to the characterization of W (t) as the expected
remaining utility for Player 1 at time t conditioned on the information up to t, assuming he follows
the suggested effort. In particular, we have
W (t) = R1 +
∫ T
t
µ1(A)ds+
∫ T
t
σY dB.
Therefore,
W (t) = EAt
[∫ T
t
µ1(A)ds+R1
]
.
By viewing W as a state variable of a (stochastic) dynamical system, we can now apply the
dynamic programming principle to solve the reformulated optimization problem (7).
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Theorem 3. Define the value function for Player 0 as
v(w, t) := sup
A∈A∗
Y ∈Y∗
Et
[∫ T
t
N∑
k=1
Ak(s)ds+ q
0(W (T )) |W (t) = w
]
.
Then, v is the unique viscosity solution to the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
vt + sup
a∈Γ1
y∈(∂φˆ1)(1>a)
[
1
2
y2σ2vww − µ1(a)vw + 1>a
]
= 0,
with terminal condition v(w, T ) = q0(w).
Proof. This is a standard dynamic programming argument which may be found, for example, in
[9, 24].
If there exists a smooth enough solution to this HJB, then by standard stochastic control
arguments, we can construct optimal feedback controls:
A(t) := A∗(W (t), t), Y (t) := Y ∗(W (t), t).
Then, using these feedback controls and the dynamics of W (t), ever player in the hierarchy can
compute W in terms of observed values. Specifically, we have
W (t) = w∗1 +
∫ t
0
(
N∑
i=1
A∗i (W (s), s)
)
Y ∗(W (s), s)− µ (A∗(W (s), s)) ds−
∫ t
0
Y ∗(W (s), s)dX1
= w∗1 +
∫ t
0
(
N∑
i=2
A∗i (W (s), s)
)
Y ∗(W (s), s)− µ (A∗(W (s), s)) ds−
∫ t
0
Y ∗(W (s), s)dX2
...
= w∗1 +
∫ t
0
A∗N (W (s), s)Y
∗(W (s), s)− µ (A∗(W (s), s)) ds−
∫ t
0
Y ∗(W (s), s)dXN
= w∗1 −
∫ t
0
µ (A∗(W (s), s)) ds−
∫ t
0
Y ∗(W (s), s)dB.
Namely, all three processes – A, Y , and W – are adapted to FX1 , · · · ,FXN , and FB . Therefore,
the proposed contract is implementable and verifiable.
Player 0 then agrees to pay Player 1 an amount R1 = W (T ), where W is evolved via the
optimal feedback controls. Player 0 announces the contract and suggested efforts and compensa-
tions. Then, we have shown that it is optimal for the rest of the principal-agent hierarchy to follow
A = (A1, · · · , AN ) and R2:N = (R2, · · · , RN ).
One major advantage of this hierarchical model is the dimensionality of the resulting PDE
– only one-dimensional in space. In comparison, the model with multiple agents reporting to
a single principal in [8] resulted in a PDE with one state variable for each agent. Therefore,
this hierarchical model is very tractable for even large N . It is worth noting, however, that this
particular dimensionality result depend on the risk-neutrality of terminal payoffs between agents
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in the hierarchy. Another important feature of the proposed approach is that Γ1 (and Γk’s) can
be parameterized by a homeomorphism whose domain is one-dimensional when the players’ utility
functions are strictly concave. This feature yields the maximization problem in the Hamiltonian
of the HJB equation to be one-dimensional at each time. This additional dimensionality reduction
result will be provided in Theorem 4.
5 Details on (f,Γ)-Concave Envelopes
In the previous iterative construction of an incentive compatible contract for the principal-agent
hierarchy, the key condition for iteration is (f,Γ)-concavity. A simpler version of this condition was
first highlighted in [8], but details were not provided on how to check (f,Γ)-concavity or construct
appropriate envelopes.
In this section, we provide a general construction of (f,Γ)-concave envelopes gˆ of a function g,
and also provide structural results about the subset where g = gˆ.
5.1 Constructing (f,Γ)-Concave Envelopes
Recall from the definition in Section 3 that the key properties of the (f,Γ)-concave envelope are
(1) f -concavity, (2) majorizing the function g over Γ, and (3) minimality. All three properties are
intuitively represented by a step in the construction in this section.
We construct the (f,Γ)-concave envelope of g in the following three steps:
1. Define φ(y) := sup {g(x) | x ∈ Γ s.t. f(x) = y}, where we set φ(y) := −∞ if f−1({y})∩Γ = ∅.
2. Compute the concave envelope φˆ of φ, then
3. Define gˆ(x) = φˆ(f(x)).
An example of the proposed construction is shown in Figure 2.
Proposition 4. For any g : Rm → R, the function gˆ, as constructed above, is the (f,Γ)-concave
envelope of g.
Proof. By construction, gˆ = φˆ◦f is f -concave and majorizes g over Γ. Suppose there exists g˜ = φ˜◦f
which is f -concave, majorizes g over Γ, and is smaller than gˆ at some point x0 ∈ Γ, i.e.,
φ˜(f(x0)) < φˆ(f(x0)). (9)
Because g˜ majorizes g over Γ, we have
φ(f(x)) = sup {g(y) | y ∈ Γ s.t. f(x) = f(y)}
≤ sup{φ˜(f(y)) | y ∈ Γ s.t. f(x) = f(y)}
= φ˜(f(x)) ∀x ∈ Γ.
Then, recalling that φ(y) = −∞ when f−1({y}) ∩ Γ = ∅, we conclude that
φ(y) ≤ φ˜(y) ∀y ∈ Rn,
which contradicts (9) because φˆ is the concave envelope of φ.
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Figure 2: An example of constructing (f,Γ)-concave envelope of g when f(x) = x.
5.2 Sufficient Conditions for Γ to be One-Dimensional
In this section we prove that if all players have utilities which are strictly concave in effort, then
Γ1 ⊆ RN for Player 0 is parameterized by a homeomorphism ψ : R → Γ1. The significance of this
result is that it provides dimensionality reduction in Player 0’s optimization problem. In particular,
rather than maximizing over a potentially N -dimensional subset Γ1 ⊆ RN , Player 0 can maximize
over values in R using the map ψ. In the lack of strict concavity, the dimension of Γ1 is not
necessarily reduced.
First, we prove an abstract result.
Lemma 2. Let f : R2 → R be continuous. Suppose that x 7→ f(x, y) is strictly concave for each y.
Then, the function T : R→ R defined as
T (y) := arg max
x∈R
f(x, y)
is continuous.
Proof. By strict concavity of x 7→ f(x, y) for each y, we conclude that T is a well-defined function.
Suppose that T is not continuous at y0. Then there exists  > 0 and a sequence yn → y0 such
that |T (yn)− T (y0)| > . Define
δ := f(T (y0), y0)−max {f(T (y0) + , y0), f(T (y0)− , y0)} > 0,
which is strictly positive by strict concavity in x.
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By continuity of f , we can find yn such that
|T (yn)− T (y0)| > 
|f(T (y0), yn)− f(T (y0), y0)| < δ/4
|f(T (y0) + , yn)− f(T (y0) + , y0)| < δ/4
|f(T (y0)− , yn)− f(T (y0)− , y0)| < δ/4.
Now, we verify two inequalities
f(T (y0), yn))− f(T (y0) + , yn) > f(T (y0), y0))− f(T (y0) + , y0)− δ/2
≥ δ − δ/2 = δ/2 > 0,
f(T (y0), yn))− f(T (y0)− , yn) > f(T (y0), y0))− f(T (y0)− , y0)− δ/2
≥ δ − δ/2 = δ/2 > 0.
But by strict concavity of x 7→ f(x, yn), this implies
arg max
x∈R
f(x, T (yn)) ∈ [T (y0)− , T (y0) + ] ,
which contradicts |T (yn)− T (y0)| > .
Next, we prove the main argument which will be iterated.
Lemma 3. Let g : Rn → R continuous. Let Γ ⊆ RN be parameterized by a homeomorphism
ψ : R → Γ such that 1>ψ(y) = y for all y ∈ R. Suppose that (y, z) 7→ g(z, ψ(y − z)) is jointly
concave and, further, that z 7→ g(z, ψ(y− z)) is strictly concave for all y ∈ R. Let f(x1, · · · , xn) :=
x1 + · · ·+ xn, gˆ be the (f,R× Γ)-concave envelope of g, and the corresponding touching set be
Γ′ := {(x1, · · · , xn) ∈ R× Γ | g(x1, · · · , xn) = gˆ(x1, · · · , xn)} .
Then, Γ′ is parameterized by a homeomorphism ψ′ : R → Γ′ such that 1>ψ′(y) = y for all y ∈ R.
Furthermore, y 7→ g(ψ′(y)) is concave.
Proof. We note that for every y ∈ R, we can parameterize the set
{(x1, · · · , xn) ∈ R× Γ | f(x1, · · · , xn) = y} ⊆ Rn
by the map z 7→ (z, ψ(y − z)). By the strict concavity of this map, we apply Lemma 2 to conclude
that the map
T (y) := arg max
z∈R
g (z, ψ(y − z))
is continuous.
Next, we compute
φ(y) := sup {g(x1, · · · , xn) | (x1, · · · , xn) ∈ R× Γ, f(x1, · · · , xn) = y}
= sup {g (z, ψ(y − z)) | z ∈ R} .
By strict concavity of z 7→ g(z, ψ(y − z)), we conclude that the supremum is attained at a single
point for each y. The pointwise supremum of the jointly concave map (y, z) 7→ g(z, ψ(y − z)) is
concave, as shown in [3], so y 7→ φ(y) is concave. Therefore, φ = φˆ, and gˆ = φ ◦ f .
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Define a new function ψ′ : R→ R× Γ as:
ψ′(y) := (T (y), ψ (y − T (y))) .
By continuity of T , ψ′ is continuous. We can also check, φ(y) = g(ψ′(y)), so y 7→ g(ψ′(y)) is concave
for all y ∈ R.
We claim that the image of ψ′ is Γ′. By definition,
Γ′ := {(x1, · · · , xn) ∈ R× Γ | g(x1, · · · , xn) = gˆ(x1, · · · , xn)}
= {(x1, · · · , xn) ∈ R× Γ | g(x1, · · · , xn) = φ ◦ f(x1, · · · , xn)}
=
⋃
y∈R
{(x1, · · · , xn) ∈ R× Γ, f(x1, · · · , xn) = y | g(x1, · · · , xn) = φ(y)}
=
⋃
y∈R
{(T (y), ψ(y − T (y)))}
= Im(ψ′).
Finally, we confirm that
1>ψ′(y) = T (y) + 1>ψ(y − T (y)) = y,
which implies ψ′ is one-to-one and an open map, so we conclude ψ′ : R→ Γ′ is a homeomorphism.
The intuition of the following main result is to apply Lemma 3 iteratively. At each step,
g represents the effective utility of Player k over Ak:N . By induction, we assume Γk+1 is one-
dimensional and parametrized by a homeomorphism ψk+1, so Player k effectively maximizes over
R2. We show under concavity assumptions that Γk is then once again one-dimensional.
Theorem 4. If each player’s utility function is strictly concave and βk ≥ 0, then Γ1 ⊆ RN is
parameterized by a homeomorphism ψ1 : R→ Γ1.
Proof. First, recall from the iteration argument that at each stage, µk : RN−k → R is a linear
combination of rk, · · · , rN with positive coefficients. Furthermore, at each step, Γk is the touching
set corresponding to the (Ak + · · ·+AN ,R× Γk+1)-concave envelope of µk.
We want to show that for each k, Γk is parameterized by a homeomorphism ψk : R→ Γk such
that 1>ψk(y) = y and y 7→ µk(ψk(y)) is concave. We proceed by induction on k.
In the base case, we know ΓN = R, and this can be parameterized by the identity map ψN (y) = y.
The concavity condition holds by concavity of rN .
Now, consider the Player k’s effective utility function, which is given by
µk(Ak:N ) = r
k(Ak) + βk+1µk+1(Ak+1:N ).
By the inductive hypothesis, there is a bijection ψk+1 : R → Γk+1 such that 1>ψk+1(y) = y and
y 7→ µk+1(ψk+1(y)) is concave.
In particular, we can confirm that
µk(z, ψk+1(y − z)) = rk(z) + βk+1µk+1(ψk+1(y − z))
is strictly concave in z and jointly concave in (y, z). The right-hand-side is jointly concave in
(y, z) as the composition of an affine function with µk+1 ◦ ψk+1, which is concave by the inductive
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hypothesis. Because rk is strictly concave, we determine the sum is strictly concave in z and jointly
concave in (y, z).
Furthermore, by the inductive hypothesis 1>ψk+1(y) = y. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 3
to conclude the (Ak + · · · + AN ,R × Γk+1)-concave envelope of µk has a corresponding touching
set Γk which is parameterized by a homeomorphism ψk : R → Γk such that 1>ψk(y) = y and
y 7→ µk(ψk(y)) is concave. Then, the result follows by induction.
The significance of this result is in reducing dimensionality in Player 0’s optimization problem
at each time step of dynamic programming from potentially N -dimensional to one-dimensional. In
particular, Player 0 can maximize any function φ : Γ1 → R by maximizing φ ◦ ψ1 : R→ R.
Practically, this result means that in the case of strictly concave utilities, not only is the HJB
PDE only one-dimensional in space, but the maximization step for computing an optimal Hamil-
tonian at each time is also one-dimensional. This means that once ψ1 is computed, Player 0’s
optimal dynamic contract can be constructed in time that does not depend upon the size of the
hierarchy. This result makes the model tractable even for very large N and contributes significantly
to the tractability of using dynamic programming to design an optimal contract in a large-scale
principal-agent hierarchy.
6 Example: Quadratic Utilities
In this section, we work through a specific example, where all agents have quadratic utilities. In
particular, we set
rk(a) := −1
2
α2ka
2
qk(r) := −βkr
wk := 0
with βk ≥ 0 and αk > 0 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ N . Finally, we choose
q0(r) := −1
2
α20r
2.
Economically, this means each player 1 ≤ k ≤ N has an increasing aversion to putting in effort
personally, which is governed by the parameter αk. Furthermore, each player 1 ≤ k ≤ N has some
aversion to paying the player below him in the hierarchy, which is governed by the parameter βk.
Player 0 is averse to uncertainty in the terminal payment to players below him.
In order to construct an optimal dynamic contract, we need to explicitly perform the iterative
construction of Section 4. Because each utility function is assumed strictly concave, we can also
apply the results of Section 5 to obtain a homeomorphism ψk : R → Γk at each step. In the
quadratic utility case, it will turn out that each Γk will be a one-dimensional linear subspace. We
will see that the iteration process only requires linear algebraic computations at each step.
Theorem 5. There exists a strictly positive-definite, diagonal matrix Λ1, a vector g1 with 1
>g1 = 1,
and a real number w∗1 such that it is equivalent for Player 0 to solve the following optimization
problem:
sup
A∈A,Y1∈Y
J0[A,R1]
subject to A(t) ∈ Γ1 ⊆ RN , t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.
Y1(t) ∈ (∂φˆ1) (A1(t) + · · ·+AN (t)) t ∈ [0, T ] a.e.,
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with the compensation scheme given by
R1 := w
∗
1 +
∫ T
0
(A1 + · · ·+AN )Y1 − µ1 (A) dt−
∫ T
0
Y1dX1
where:
• µ1(x) = − 12x>Λ1x,
• φˆ1(y) = − 12g>1 Λ1g1y2, so ∂φˆ(y) = −g>1 Λ1g1y, and
• Γ1 is a one-dimensional subspace parametrized the isomorphism ψ1(y) = g1y.
Proof. We follow the iteration argument of Theorems 2 and 4 to construct each µk, Γk, and the
homeomorphism ψk : R → Γk. For Player N , we trivially have that µN (x) = − 12α2Nx2, ΓN = R,
and the homeomorphism is ψN : R→ ΓN is the identity ψN (y) = y.
Consider Player k with k > N . We know by Theorems 2 and 4 that there exist µk+1 : RN−k−1 →
R, Γk+1 ⊆ RN−k−1, and a homeomorphism ψk+1 : R→ Γk+1 such that 1>ψk+1(y) = y.
We suppose further that there exists a strictly positive-definite matrix Λk+1 and vector gk+1
with the property 1>gk+1 = 1 such that µk+1(x) = − 12x>Λk+1x and ψk+1(y) = gk+1y.
Then by Theorem 2, µk : RN−k−1 → R can be written:
µk(x, y) = r
k(x) + βk+1µk+1(y) = −1
2
[
x
y
]> [
α2k 0
0 βk+1Λk+1
] [
x
y
]
,
or in the form µk(x) = − 12x>Λkx for a strictly positive-definite, diagonal matrix.
By Theorem 4, we need to compute the functions Tk : R→ R, ψk : R→ RN−k and φk : R→ R.
We can compute:
Tk(y) := arg max
z∈R
µk(z, ψk+1(y − z))
= arg max
z
[
−1
2
α2kz
2 − 1
2
βk+1(y − z)2g>k+1Λk+1gk+1
]
=
βk+1g
>
k+1Λk+1gk+1
α2k + βk+1g
>
k+1Λk+1gk+1
y,
and then immediately, we have
ψk(y) := (Tk(y), ψk+1(y − Tk(y))) = gky
for a vector gk computable in terms of Tk and ψk+1. Further, we have y = 1
>ψk(y) = 1>gky, so
1>gk = 1.
Lastly, we have
φk(y) := sup
z∈R
µk(z, ψk+1(y − z)) = µk(ψk(y)) = −1
2
y2g>k Λkgk.
By induction, the result follows. We note that because ψ1 : R → Γ1 is linear, then Γ1 is a
one-dimensional linear subspace.
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Then, as in Theorem 3, Player 0 can define a value function and characterize it as the unique
viscosity solution to an HJB equation. However, in this case, the HJB equation simplifies consid-
erably:
Corollary 1. Define the value function v for Player 0 as in Theorem 2. Then v is the unique
viscosity solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
vt + sup
y∈R
[γ
2
(γσ2vww + vw)y
2 + y
]
= 0,
with terminal condition v(w, T ) = q0(w) and γ := g>1 Λ1g1.
The proof is just a particular case of Theorem 3. The significance is that, in this case, the HJB
reduces to only one state variable and a one-dimensional maximization over R at each time.
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